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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DAMNED IF  YOU  DO, DAMNED IF 
YOU  DON’T: A PUBLIC  EMPLOYEE’S  TRILEMMA  REGARDING 
TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that you, a police officer, are called to testify against 
your supervisor who has demoted another police officer for arrest­
ing your supervisor’s brother on felony warrants for dealing drugs.1 
What are your options?  You may truthfully testify and run the risk 
of lawfully being fired as a result of your boss’s retaliation, refuse to 
testify and face contempt of court for disobeying the subpoena, or 
lie under oath and commit perjury.2  This was the plaintiff’s 
trilemma in Morales v. Jones.3  Morales chose to testify truthfully, 
and, fortunately, the court ruled that his deposition testimony was 
protected.4  Not many public employees in Morales’s circumstances 
are as lucky as he was, however.  In the plethora of cases concern­
ing a public employee’s protected speech, the subject of truthful 
testimony presents an unsettled issue.5 
When it comes to deciding the degree to which a public em­
ployee’s truthful testimony should be protected, or if it enjoys any 
1. See, e.g., Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 593, 595 (7th Cir. 2007). 
2. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2008) (pointing 
out the testifying dilemma that public workers face); cf. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 
574 F.3d 696, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that testifying is part of a police officer’s job 
duties; consequently his obligation to testify does not engender First Amendment pro­
tection). See generally Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The First Amendment, and Pub­
lic Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. 
REV. 939, 960 (2001) (asserting that public employees do not have an interest in rocking 
the boat because they face public disapproval aside from the risk of losing their jobs). 
3. Morales, 494 F.3d at 590-91. 
4. Id. at 598 (“Being deposed in a civil suit pursuant to a subpoena was unques­
tionably not one of Morales’ job duties. . . .”). 
5. Testimony is defined as “[e]vidence that a competent witness under oath or 
affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1613 (9th ed. 2009).  Truthful testimony implies that the witness is telling the truth as he 
understands it.  On the other hand, false statements made knowingly, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, generally receive no First Amendment protection. See Hon. 
Harvey Brown & Sarah V. Kerrigan, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The Vehicle for Protecting Public 
Employees’ Constitutional Rights, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 619, 653 n.213 (1995); Scott E. 
Michael, “Lie or Lose Your Job!” Protecting a Public Employee’s First Amendment 
Right to Testify Truthfully, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 413, 415 (2006) (demonstrating that the 
courts disagree on the degree of protection a public employee’s truthful testimony 
should enjoy). 
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First Amendment protection,6 the courts are divided.7  In forming 
their decisions, courts try to interpret the Supreme Court’s elusive 
decisions, which, unsurprisingly, have led to inconsistent results.8 
Indeed, courts’ rulings vary widely depending on their inter­
pretation of speech involving a matter of public concern and 
whether employee’s official duties compelled the testimonial 
speech.  Several courts have adopted a per se rule9 that truthful tes­
timony in a court of law or administrative hearing constitutes pro­
tected speech because it is inherently a matter of public concern.10 
Under these circumstances, retaliatory dismissal would jeopardize 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment of the United States Constitu­
tion states in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .” Id. 
7. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 229 (ruling that a public employee’s truthful testimony is 
automatically protected because every citizen has a duty to testify); Johnston v. Harris 
Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1576-78 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that truthful 
testimony deserves full First Amendment aegis because it is a per se matter of public 
concern); Reeves v. Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“‘[The interest of the judicial system] along with the first amendment values, would 
not be served’ if the fear of retaliation . . . ‘effectively muzzled’ witnesses testifying in 
. . . court.” (quoting Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359, 368 (1982))). Compare Wright v. 
Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505-07 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that truthful testimony deserves heightened but not per se protection), with Huppert, 
574 F.3d at 708-10 (holding that truthful testimony, even when related to a matter of 
public concern, is not protected so long as it is made pursuant to a public employee’s 
official duties), and Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 445-47 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that truthful testimony is protected only when the content of the testimony 
constitutes a matter of public concern).  The First Amendment has been extended to 
protect the right of witnesses to give truthful testimony. See Langley v. Adams Cnty., 
987 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The law is clearly established that the ‘First 
Amendment protects the right to testify truthfully at trial.’” (quoting Melton v. City of 
Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on reh’g en banc, 
928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991))). 
8. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (ruling that speech given pursu­
ant to “official duties” is not protected); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 667 (1994) 
(holding that the government may fire an employee if it reasonably believes that his 
speech will potentially disrupt his effective job performance); Rankin v. McPherson, 
483 U.S. 378, 378 (1987) (determining that even inappropriate and controversial speech 
is protected so long as it involves a matter of public concern); Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (holding that a matter of public concern is measured “by the 
content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record”); 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 563 (1968) (positing that speech is protected if it 
involves a matter of public concern and when the interest of the public employee in 
commenting on such matter does not outweigh the government’s interest in efficiently 
performing its duties). 
9. “Per se” is defined as “[o]f, in, or by itself.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 
(9th ed. 2009). 
10. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that responding 
to a subpoena enjoys First Amendment protection much like truthful testimony, be­
cause contextually it constitutes speech on a matter of public concern); Johnston, 869 
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the integrity of the judicial process because the public employee 
might be deterred from testifying by fear of retribution.11  Other 
courts have held that truthful testimony deserves heightened but 
not per se protection.12  Conversely, the courts that have refused to 
grant First Amendment protection for truthful testimony have rea­
soned that speech that relates to a public employee’s official duties 
or his private interests is not safeguarded.13 
Truthful testimony is a unique form of speech aimed at helping 
the judiciary to arrive at the truth. Testimony is unique because “it 
is every [citizen’s] duty to give testimony before a duly constituted 
tribunal,”14 and the citizen does not have a choice over the content 
of the testimony.15  The mission of our justice system is to ensure 
equal justice under the law.16  What makes this goal possible is 
searching for and discovering the truth.17  Truthful testimony is 
therefore one of the crucial components in the proper functioning 
of our judicial process, and its protection should play an essential 
role in maintaining the integrity of the justice system.18  Truthful 
testimony is not only a tool in revealing the truth, but, unlike other 
forms of speech, it is also often mandatory because the witness is 
obligated to testify or face the consequences.19 
In the interest of protecting the judicial truth-seeking process, 
this Note will argue that truthful testimony in general, and particu­
larly compelled truthful testimony, should receive First Amend-
F.2d at 1578 (“When an employee testifies before an official government adjudicatory 
or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is inherently of public concern.”). 
11. Donatucci, 81 F.3d at 1291 (holding that an employee’s fear of retaliation may 
lead to distorting the truth, which, in turn, would jeopardize the mission of our justice 
system); Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578 (stating that “[w]e would compromise the integrity 
of the judicial process if we tolerated state retaliation for testimony that is damaging to 
the state” because employees may not be forthcoming out of fear of reprisal). 
12. Wright, 40 F.3d at 1507 n.6 (“[E]xcept in the rarest of cases . . . , truthful 
testimony is protected speech.”). 
13. Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the fact that speech was given during a hearing is immaterial so long as “the statement 
was made not to further any public debate, but only to further the interests of the two 
officers involved” (citing Arvinger v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 
1988))). 
14. Ullmann v. Unitec States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 n.15 (1956). 
15. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 228 n.8 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is 
axiomatic that ‘[e]very citizen . . . owes to his society the duty of giving testimony to aid 
in the enforcement of the law.’” (quoting Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 
n.2 (1961))). 
16. See Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 228. 
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ment safeguards, and its protection should not be predicated on 
“matters of public concern”20 or “official duties” tests.21  Instead, 
truthful testimony should be immunized from job retaliation similar 
to the way testimony has been immunized from damage claims.22 
Part I of this Note will review the Supreme Court’s stance regarding 
public employees’ speech.  Part II will discuss the protection that 
witness testimony enjoys from civil damage claims and will argue 
that a public employee’s truthful testimony should receive the same 
immunization. 
Next, Part III will identify the lower courts’ divergent decisions 
on the issue of truthful testimony pre-Garcetti and discuss the retal­
iation that public employees face at work as a result of their truthful 
testimonies.  Part IV will discuss the lower courts’ split decisions 
post-Garcetti.  Part V will demonstrate the ramifications that legal 
uncertainty has on this issue—not only on public employees, but on 
the integrity of our judicial system and the functioning of our gov­
ernment as a whole.  Lastly, Part V will conclude that truthful testi­
mony should be protected and afforded immunity from job 
retaliation. 
I. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
A.	 Matter of Public Concern and the Balancing Act: Pickering/ 
Connick Test 
An historical overview of the evolution of a public employee’s 
speech reveals four distinct stages.  Until the early 1950s, the Su­
preme Court considered government employment a privilege, not a 
right.23  From the mid 1950s until the late 1960s, the Court afforded 
20. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (holding that speech is a matter of 
public concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community”).  The “matter of public concern” test has 
received criticism because of its vagueness and the propensity of unpredictable results. 
See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 
101, 115 (1995). 
21. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, [they] are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communica­
tions from employer discipline.”); Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. 
Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protection For Public Employees, 7 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 22, 22-23 (2008) (arguing for a very narrow application of Garcetti 
while advocating for constitutional and international protection of public employees’ 
speech). 
22. See infra Part IV.A. 
23. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding a New York 
statute which allowed the Board of Regents to terminate teachers who were members 
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public employees greater First Amendment rights.24  During this 
time the Court unambiguously favored the government, but recog­
nized that its workers could not lose their constitutional rights by 
virtue of their employment.25 
The Supreme Court’s position regarding a public employee’s 
freedom of speech, beginning in 1968 and continuing until 2006, de­
noted a more balanced approach in determining public employees’ 
First Amendment rights.  The Court’s rationale during this period 
was that if a public employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of pub­
lic concern, his speech would be protected, provided that the gov­
ernment’s interest in functioning properly did not outweigh the 
employee’s interest in commenting on these matters.26  In 2006, the 
Court presented an additional test whereby, if a public employee 
spoke pursuant to his official duties, his speech would not be pro­
tected even if it addressed a matter of public concern.27 
Pickering v. Board of Education, a landmark case, set the stan­
dard for measuring the current parameters of a public employee’s 
right to free speech under the First Amendment.28  Marvin Picker­
ing was fired from his position as a school teacher because he pub­
lished an article in the local newspaper criticizing the school board 
and the superintendent for their mishandling of the proposals to 
raise funds for the school.29  Pickering responded to his termination 
by taking the matter to trial.30 
Balancing both parties’ interests, the Supreme Court deter­
mined that a government employer could not terminate an em­
ployee for merely exercising his First Amendment right of speaking 
of the Communist Party), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 593-94 (1967); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) 
(“The [public employee] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”), abrogated by Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06, 
and Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987). 
24. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06 (asserting the notion that public em­
ployment may be denied on any terms, no matter how unreasonable, is no longer 
viable). 
25. Id. 
26. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
27. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
28. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1069 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that Pickering is the first case to 
recognize a public employee’s right to free speech).  But in Pickering, the Court stated 
that its ruling relied on a series of cases originating with Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 
183 (1952), that denied the withholding of state employees’ salaries because of failure to 
complete a loyalty oath. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
29. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-65. 
30. Id. at 565. 
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on a matter of public concern.31  In the Court’s opinion, Pickering’s 
article constituted a matter of public concern32 because “free and 
open debate is [not only] vital to informed decision-making by the 
electorate,” but also Pickering, as a citizen, taxpayer, and teacher, 
had a civic stake and a free speech right to discuss whether school 
funds were properly managed.33  By the same token, the state had a 
prerogative to regulate an employee’s speech in the interest of its 
efficient and proper functioning.34  The Court put both interests on 
the scale, weighing the interest of the employee, speaking on mat­
ters of public concern as a citizen on one hand, and on the other, 
measuring the interest of the government as an employer in “pro­
moting the efficiency” of public services.35  The balance shifted in 
Pickering’s favor because, “absent proof of false statements,” it was 
his right as a citizen to speak on matters “of public importance” and 
his right trumped the school’s interest of functioning efficiently.36 
Fifteen years later, in Connick v. Myers, the Court further 
redefined the outer-limits of public employees’ speech, asserting 
that speech which touches on a matter of a public concern triggers 
the Pickering balancing test.37  The plaintiff, an assistant district at­
torney, on her own initiative, prepared and distributed a question­
naire shortly after her supervisor informed her she was being 
31. Id. at 574-75. 
32. Matters of public concern include speech on “government corruption, racial 
discrimination or—as in the case of teacher Marvin Pickering—how school boards allo­
cate their funds between academics and athletics.”  David L. Hudson, Jr., The Garcetti 
Effect, Government Employees Fear High Court Case Undermines Retaliation Protec­
tions, 94 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (2008). 
33. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.  Also, in justifying First Amendment protection, 
the Court articulated that matters of public concern are of beneficial value to the public 
at large, and that public employees are well-suited to comment on them. Id. at 572. 
34. Id. at 568. 
35. Id. at 566-68.  The burden of showing that his interest as a citizen outweighs 
the interest of his employer rests with the public employee who has to show that his 
speech addressed a matter of public concern.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-50 
(1983). Once that is established, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the 
justifications for the employee’s demotion or discharge. Id. at 150-51. When balancing 
the employee’s right, the higher the level of public concern, the higher the need for the 
government to bring forth a showing of disruption in the office. Id. at 152; Brown & 
Kerrigan, supra note 5, at 653. These showings include: R 
(1) The need to maintain discipline or harmony among coworkers; (2) The
 
need for confidentiality; (3) The need to curtail conduct which impedes the
 
employee’s proper and competent performance of his daily duties; and (4) The
 
need to encourage a close and personal relationship between the employee
 
and his superiors, where the relationship calls for loyalty and competence.
 
Id. 
36. Id. at 574. 
37. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
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\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE212.txt unknown Seq: 7  5-OCT-11 14:39 
2011] DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF YOU DON’T 
transferred to a different department.38  The plaintiff’s supervisors 
regarded the questionnaire as “a mini-insurrection,” fueled by her 
resentment for her transfer.39  The Court determined that only one 
out of the fourteen items on the questionnaire addressed a matter 
of public concern.40  The rest of the questionnaire represented the 
plaintiff’s personal dissatisfaction regarding internal office policy 
and disapproval of her transfer.41 
Accordingly, its content contained a minimal level of matter of 
public concern and consequently the government’s proper function­
ing received priority, making the plaintiff’s speech unworthy of 
First Amendment protection.42  The Court specified that a matter 
of public concern, in addition to the content, was also measured by 
the “form[ ] and context of a given statement, as revealed by the 
whole record.”43  The context did not involve a matter of public 
concern either, because the time, place, and manner in which the 
plaintiff created the questionnaire favored the likelihood of office 
disharmony.44  Consequently, due to the context, and because the 
questionnaire represented a low level of public concern, the Court 
ruled in favor of the government.45 Connick’s holding reflected the 
view that the government has duties to perform, and if every issue 
is regarded as a constitutional matter, the government’s perform­
ance would suffer.46 
In sum, the Pickering/Connick test established a two-step ap­
proach in determining whether a public employee’s speech is pro­
tected.  The first step is to decide if the speech in question involves 
a matter of public concern.47  If so, the court will balance the inter­
est of the public employee’s speech against that of the government’s 
interest in efficiently performing its duties.48  When the balance tips 
38. Id. at 141. 
39. Id. at 141, 151. 
40. Id. at 148.  Item eleven of the questionnaire asked: “Do you ever feel pres­
sured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates?” Id. at 
155. 
41. Id. at 148. 
42. Id. at 154. 
43. Id. at 147-48. 
44. Id. at 152-53.  The Court stated that context is determined by the time, place, 
and manner of speech. Id. 
45. Id. at 154. 
46. Id. at 149. 
47. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
48. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140. 
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in favor of the public employee, the speech is protected; otherwise, 
it is not.49 
B. Inappropriate Speech, Yet Protected 
Four years after Connick, the Court was confronted with the 
question of whether a public employee’s inappropriate and contro­
versial statement, which nonetheless fell within the realm of a mat­
ter of public concern, deserved First Amendment protection.50  In 
Rankin v. McPherson, the Court answered this question in the af­
firmative, expanding the notion of safeguarded speech.51  In 1981, 
Ardith McPherson worked as a data-entry employee in a county 
constable’s office where she performed clerical duties.52  She had 
heard about the attempted assassination of the United States Presi­
dent Ronald Reagan on the radio.53  In the course of discussing the 
President’s reform in reducing welfare programs with a co-worker, 
she said: “[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.”54  This 
statement caused her job termination.55 
The Court ruled that McPherson’s comment, while inappropri­
ate and controversial, viewed contextually, addressed a matter of 
public concern because she uttered it while discussing the policies 
of the President’s administration.56  However, the Court clarified 
that unlike McPherson’s statement, a comment which amounts to 
an imminent threat to kill the president enjoys no protection.57  In 
the Court’s balancing act of the employee’s and the government’s 
interests, McPherson came through victorious, mainly, because the 
Court considered her utterance a matter of public concern.58  In ad­
dition, the fact that she was a data-entry employee and served no 
confidential policy-making role received substantial weight in her 
favor, because in the Court’s view, the speech of a low-level em­
ployee posed minimal risk to workplace efficiency.59 
49. Id. 
50. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1987). 
51. Id. at 380, 386. 
52. Id. at 378, 380. 
53. Id. at 381. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 380. 
56. Id. at 386-87. 
57. Id. 
58. See id. 
59. Id. at 390-91 (“Where . . . an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, 
or public contact role, the danger to the agency’s successful functioning from that em­
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C. Setting Procedural Guidelines 
For the first time, in Waters v. Churchill, the Court introduced 
and emphasized the importance of implementing reliable proce­
dures when making adverse employment decisions.60  The plaintiff, 
Cheryl Churchill, who worked as a nurse for a public hospital was 
terminated after she allegedly made disruptive comments about her 
department to a trainee nurse.61  Churchill, however, claimed that 
she was fired because she disagreed with the hospital’s policies of 
nurse cross training and commented that certain units were left un­
derstaffed.62  The Waters v. Churchill Court explained that in defer­
ence to its interest of functioning properly, the government may fire 
an employee if it reasonably believes that his or her speech will po­
tentially disrupt its effective performance.63  With this in mind, the 
government can only dismiss an employee in good faith64 and, more 
importantly, after a reasonable investigation.65  In addition, the 
government’s greater control over a public employee’s speech 
hinges on “the nature of [its] mission as employer.”66  The Court 
did not, however, devise a detailed procedural test.67  Conse­
quently, the courts, when faced with these issues, still employ a 
case-by-case approach. 
60. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994). 
61. Id. at 664-65. 
62. Id. at 666-67. 
63. Id. at 677-78.  The Court stated that reasonable care is “the care that a rea­
sonable manager would use before making an employment decision—discharge, sus­
pension, reprimand, or whatever else—of the sort involved in the particular case.” Id. 
at 678.  Instances of unreasonable actions would include disciplinary reprimands when 
the evidence does not exist, or is “extremely weak . . . [or] when strong evidence is 
clearly available—if, for instance, an employee is accused of writing an improper letter 
to the editor, and instead of just reading the letter, the employer decides what it said 
based on unreliable hearsay.” Id. at 677. 
64. Id.  The Court noted that “[i]t is necessary that the decisionmaker reach its 
conclusion about what was said in good faith, rather than as a pretext; but it does not 
follow that good faith [alone] is sufficient” under the First Amendment. Id. 
65. Id. at 677-78. 
66. Id. at 674.  The Court stated: 
The government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively . . . as possible is 
elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a 
significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the 
speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency.  But where the 
government is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achiev­
ing its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate. 
Id. at 675; see also Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 5, at 658 (“[The Court’s] holding [in R 
Waters] add[ed] a procedural step to an employer’s consideration of the impact of the 
employee’s speech . . . .”). 
67. Waters, 511 U.S. at 661. 
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D. Garcetti and the Official Duty Standard 
In 2006, faced once again with the issue of a public employee’s 
free speech in the workplace, the Court introduced an additional 
test to determine a worker’s First Amendment protection. Indeed, 
the Garcetti Court posited that in order to be protected, besides 
satisfying the matter of public concern requirement, a worker’s 
speech could not stem from his “official duties.”68  Because—the 
Court added—when public employees speak in the course of their 
official duties, they do not speak in their capacity as citizens; thus, 
the Constitution cannot protect them “from employer discipline.”69 
In Garcetti, the plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attor­
ney, wrote a memorandum recommending that his supervisors dis­
miss a criminal case because his investigation revealed that the case 
relied on “serious misrepresentations” on the part of the Los Ange­
les County Sheriff’s Department.70  While Ceballos’s supervisors 
decided to pursue the case despite his recommendation, Ceballos 
was subjected to numerous retaliatory actions.71 
In reaching its decision, the Court differentiated between em­
ployee speech and citizen speech.72  The dispositive factor was that 
Ceballos prepared the memorandum “pursuant to his duties as a 
calendar deputy” and not in his capacity as a citizen.73  In writing 
the memorandum, the Court noted, he simply complied with his 
professional obligations and responsibilities.74  Consequently, limit­
ing speech, derived from a public worker’s job, did not impinge 
upon his First Amendment rights as a citizen.75  The Court con­
68. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); see also Elisabeth Dale, Em­
ployee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Cebal­
los, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 175 (2008) (“[T]he Court in Garcetti defined 
public employee speech rights in a way that may ultimately strengthen the hand of 
public employees.”). But see Erwin Chemerinksy, The Rookie Year of the Roberts 
Court and A Look Ahead: Civil Rights, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 535, 538-39 (2007) (“Surely 
government employees do not give up their citizenship when they walk into the govern­
ment office building.  But to me there are real consequences of the [Garcetti] case and 
why it is so misguided is that it is much less likely that wrongdoing will be exposed by 
government employees.”). 
69. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
70. Id. at 414.  Ceballos’s memorandum stated that the deputy sheriff had falsi­
fied an affidavit to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 413-14. 
71. Id. at 414-15. 
72. Id. at 424. 
73. Id. at 421. 
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cluded that this limitation was merely an expression of the govern­
ment’s exercise of its managerial role.76 
In addition, the Court determined that defining the meaning 
of “official duties” would be unwarranted because a public em­
ployee’s daily tasks often differ noticeably from his official job 
description.77  Instead, the courts must follow a case-by-case in­
quiry.78  The Court stated that the “official duties” rationale is 
based on the attempt to avoid judicial interference in communica­
tions between the government and its employees and to give the 
public employer a degree of discretion in performing its duties.79 
On the other hand, the Court emphasized the paramount impor­
tance of exposing governmental corruption in a democracy and re­
ferred to various appropriate mechanisms available to employees, 
such as whistle-blower statutes,80 labor codes, and other constitu­
76. Id. at 422. 
77. Id. at 424-25.  In the words of the Court: 
Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an em­
ployee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an 
employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s 
professional duties for First Amendment purposes. 
Id. 
78. See id. 
79. Id. at 422-23. 
80. Peter Katel, Protecting Whistleblowers, Do Employees Who Speak Out Need 
Better Protection?, CQ RESEARCHER, Vol. 16, No. 12, 265, Mar. 31, 2006, available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/111203devine.pdf; The Federal Workforce: Observations 
on Protections From Discrimination and Reprisal for Whistleblowing: Testimony Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (2001) [hereinafter The Federal Work Force] (state­
ment of J. Christopher Mihm, Director, Strategic Issues), available at http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d01715t.pdf.  However, possibly due to the “complexity of the 
redress system” and the multiple ways employed to report these cases, “lacks a clear 
picture” of the amount of whistleblowing retaliatory cases filed by federal employees. 
Id. 
On the federal level, there are about forty laws enacted to protect whistleblowers. 
See Katel, supra.  For some of the statutes, see generally, Merit System Principles Act 
2002, 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (2006); Prohibited Personnel Practices Act 2008, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 
(2006); Labor Management Relations Act, 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-69 (2006); Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2006). 
The federal employees of the executive branch can redress their grievances of dis­
crimination or retaliation for whistleblowing in three ways. First, they may file their 
complaints within their agencies. The Federal Workforce, supra, at 2.  Next, they may 
take them up with one of three administrative agencies; namely, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC); the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB); and 
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). Id.  These agencies are in charge of the investiga­
tion or adjudication of public employees’ complaints. Finally, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the employees’ last resort. Id.  However, federal 
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tional obligations.81  But the Court stated that it refused the notion 
of planting a constitutional seed behind every workplace speech.82 
In sum, the current Supreme Court’s test on public employees’ 
speech provides that speech flowing from their “official duties” re­
ceives no constitutional protection, even if it constitutes a matter of 
public concern.83  Finally, the Supreme Court has not specifically 
addressed the narrower question of whether a public employee’s 
truthful testimony is safeguarded.  However, relying on the com­
employees must exhaust the first two levels of grievances before appealing to the court. 
Id. at 3.  In 1978, Congress passed the first comprehensive whistleblower legislation 
which promulgated the creation of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and 
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) as agencies responsible for the deliberation of 
retaliatory complaints. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 
Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).  Eleven years 
later, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) intended to improve the reprisal pro­
cess came into effect. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 
101 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 2302). Generally, the WPA statute 
protects whistleblowers when reporting a violation of law, gross mismanagement, gross 
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health 
or safety. Whistleblower Protection: Survey of Federal Employees on Misconduct and 
Protection from Reprisal: Fact Sheet for the Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the Civil Ser­
vice, H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service 1, n.1, n. 2 (1992) [hereinafter Survey of 
Federal Employees on Civil Service], available at http://archive.gao.gov/d33t10/ 
147240.pdf.  As to the structure of the administrative grievance bodies, the EEOC is the 
body responsible for reviewing and hearing complaints that employees file within their 
agencies. The Federal Workforce, supra, at 2-3.  MSPB handles more serious cases such 
as retaliatory actions leading to dismissal or transfer for more than fourteen days. 
Other complaints, such as transfers or denial of promotions, can be filed with the OSC. 
Id. at 3.  If the OSC does not act within 120 days, whistleblowers can take their cases to 
the MSPB. Id.  An employer may appeal a MSPB or EEOC decision by filing with the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a court of exclusive jurisdictions 
over whistleblower cases. Id.  Employees who work in the public health and safety 
sectors can file their grievances directly with the Department of Labor (DOL). 
The process of redressing First Amendment violations under the whistle-blower 
statutes is cumbersome and has not proven effective. See Garcia, supra note 21, at 22 R 
(“[S]tatutory protection for whistleblowers can be ineffective and sometimes counter­
productive for public employees.”); see also Federal Employee Redress: A System in 
Need of Reform: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service, and 
General Government, H. Comm. on Appropriations, 1-6 (1996) [hereinafter A System in 
Need of Reform] (statement of Timothy P. Bowling, Associate Director, Federal Man­
agement and Workforce Issues, General Government Division) (evidencing the ineffi­
ciency of the whistleblower redress system), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 
1996/gg96110t.pdf; Federal Employee Redress:  An Opportunity for Reform: Testimony 
Before H. Subcomm. on the Civil Service, H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 1­
6 (1995) [hereinafter An Opportunity for Reform] (statement of Timothy P. Bowling, 
Director, Federal Management and Workforce Issues, General Government Division), 
available at http://161.203.16.4/papr2pdf/155680.pdf. 
81. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425-26. 
82. Id. at 426-27. 
83. Id. at 421. 
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mon law tradition, it has held that trial witnesses’ testimonies are 
immune from damage claims.  The following Section discusses the 
rationale for this protection. 
II. WITNESSES’ RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 
At common law, trial witnesses enjoyed absolute immunity 
from civil damage liability for their court testimonies.84  The pur­
pose of this immunity was to avoid two types of self-censorship85— 
refusing to testify and distorting the truth.86  As this Note will later 
explore, a similar rationale should apply to the effort of protecting a 
public employee’s truthful testimony from employer retaliation be­
cause the truth-finding process compels this protection. 
Overcoming self-censorship was so compelling at common law 
that the rule afforded protection even to those who offered false 
and malicious testimony.87  Indeed, the Court of Exchequer in Hen­
derson v. Broomhead held “that no action will lie for words spoken 
or written in the course of giving evidence,” regardless of their ma­
licious nature.88  In Henderson, the plaintiff asserted a damages 
claim against the defendant maintaining that the defendant’s affida­
vit, given during another trial proceeding, falsely and maliciously 
defamed the plaintiff.89  The court firmly resolved that witnesses 
were immune from damage claims and asserted that it based its de­
cision on numerous legal authorities rooted in centuries of judge-
made legal jurisprudence.90  Holding otherwise, the court stated, 
84. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1983); Henderson v. Broomhead, 
(1859) 157 Eng. Rep. 964 (Exch.) 968 (refusing to recognize a cause of action against 
witnesses who testify in court even if their speech is defamatory and malicious); Revis v. 
Smith, (1856) 139 Eng. Rep. 1314 (C.P.) 1314 (stating that “[n]o action lies against a 
man for a statement made by him, whether by affidavit or [verbally], in the course of a 
judicial proceeding, even [if the statement is false or malicious] ‘and without any rea­
sonable or probable cause’”); Anfield v. Feverhill, (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 (K.B.) 
(holding that witnesses are immune from damages liability for their testimony in trial); 
Cutler v Dixon, (1585) 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B.) 887-88 (denying the plaintiff’s claim 
because “if actions should be permitted [against witnesses], those who have just cause 
for complaint, would not dare to complain for fear of infinite vexation”). 
85. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333 (citing Henderson, 157 Eng. Rep. at 968-69); see also 
Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1998) (stating that retaliation against an em­
ployee at will for testifying in court may ‘“injure [the employee] in his person or prop­
erty’” and in turn subjects the employer to civil liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 
(quoting Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (2006))). 
86. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333 n.13. 
87. Id. at 331-32; see supra note 84. R 
88. Henderson, 157 Eng. Rep. at 968. 
89. Id. at 967. 
90. Id. at 968. 
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would undermine witnesses’ willingness “to speak freely” resulting 
in “great mischief [for the] Courts of justice.”91 
Similarly, the Supreme Court affirmed this well-established 
common law principle in Briscoe v. LaHue.92  There, the Court held 
that a police officer was immune from civil liability suits under 42 
U.S.C. § 198393 based on his allegedly perjurious testimony at a 
criminal trial.94  Briscoe, the plaintiff, had been convicted of bur­
glarizing a house trailer.95  Briscoe claimed that LaHue, the defen­
dant, lied at Briscoe’s trial when he testified that Briscoe was one 
out of fifty to a hundred people “whose prints would match a par­
tial thumbprint” found at the crime scene.96  Briscoe insisted that 
the testimony was perjurious, because the FBI and state police had 
deemed the partial thumbprint evidence unreliable.97 
The Court noted that the legislators, by enacting this section of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, intended to extend the same protec­
tion from damage claims to trial witnesses as they had under the 
common law.98  The policy rationale behind this rule was to allow 
“the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth [to be] as free 
and unobstructed as possible,” so that the judicial truth-seeking 
mission may be best served.99  In addition, the Court observed that 
protecting witnesses from damage liability is essential, especially in 
light of a witness’ non-negotiable duty to testify.100  The rule pro­
tected witnesses as well as other integral players in the judicial pro­
cess, such “as judges, sheriffs, and marshals,” and applied to both 
public officials and private citizens.101  Generally, all those who 
played a crucial role in the judicial system were immune from civil 
suits.102  Applying this common law rationale to a public em­
ployee’s truthful testimony would avoid current variant outcomes 
and confusion as shown in the next Section. 
91. Id. 
92. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 325. 
93. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
94. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 331. 
95. Id. at 326. 
96. Id. at 327. 
97. Id. 
98. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330. 
99. Id. at 333 (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860)). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 341 n.26. 
102. Id. at 330-31. 
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III. THE CIRCUIT SCHISM PRIOR TO GARCETTI 
A. Fully Protecting Truthful Testimony 
Even pre-Garcetti, courts’ divergent perspectives on the notion 
of “matters of public concern,” pertinent to testimonial speech, 
yielded inconsistent results.103  Some courts viewed truthful testi­
mony as another form of run-of-the-mill speech, and as such, they 
relied squarely on the content of testimony to determine whether it 
deserved protection.104  Others focused their analysis on the context 
in which the testimony was made.105  They argued that because tes­
timonial speech was compulsory and given before a fact-finding or 
judicial body, it was inherently a matter of public concern; thus it 
enjoyed full First Amendment protection.106  Others took the mid­
dle road, reasoning that truthful testimony deserved heightened but 
not per se protection.107 
The justification for the per se “matters of public concern” ap­
proach is that to allow an employer to retaliate against an employee 
for testifying would discourage that person from speaking truthfully 
and undermine the judicial system.108 Johnston v. Harris County 
Flood Control District stands in the forefront of the line of cases 
that have adopted the per se test; courts faced with claims of the per 
se rule have relied substantially on this case.109  Carl Johnston 
worked for the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFD).110 
He testified at an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) hearing 
on behalf of a co-worker and against his employer.111  After his tes­
103. See supra note 7. R 
104. Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2004); Arvinger v. 
Mayor of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that if a testimonial statement 
does not involve issues of public concern, it is not protected). 
105. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 
1989); Reeves v. Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1987). 
106. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578. 
107. Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505-07 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
108. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578. 
109. Catletti v. Rampe, 334 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Johnston’s per se 
rule); see also Padilla v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1999); 
Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1289 (3d Cir. 1996) (extending a per se rule relying on 
Johnston); Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505; Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 483 (10th Cir. 
1994). But see Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 925-27, 926 n.6 (cit­
ing Johnston but specifically not deciding whether or not to accept a per se rule). 
110. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1568. 
111. Id. 
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timony, he was subjected to myriad retaliatory actions112 that even­
tually resulted in his termination.113 
Subsequently, he sued his former employer, alleging a violation 
of his First Amendment liberty to testify freely.114  The testimony in 
question addressed a personal dispute between Johnston’s co­
worker and the HCFD.115  However, the court held it was immate­
rial that the content of Johnston’s testimonial speech dealt with a 
private issue.116  Rather, the court explained that the controlling 
factor for its constitutional protection was the context because 
“[w]hen a [public] employee testifies before an official government 
adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is in­
herently of public concern.”117 
Seven years later, in Pro v. Donatucci,118 another circuit ex­
panded the notion of the per se rule by applying it to “would-be 
testimony” concerning a purely private matter.119  In a case of first 
impression, the court held that responding to a subpoena enjoys 
First Amendment protection much like truthful testimony because, 
contextually, it constitutes speech on a matter of public concern.120 
Sisinia Pro worked as a secretary for Ronald Donatucci, Register of 
Wills in Philadelphia.121  Donatucci’s wife subpoenaed Pro to testify 
in her divorce action against her husband.122  Pro appeared in court 
to testify but did not have the opportunity to do so.123  A short time 
112. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., No. H-82-21729, 1986 WL 
14438, at *1-3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 1986). The United States District Court found that 
Johnston had worked for HCFD for thirty years. Id. at *1.  His job performance, al­
though not stellar, was on par with that of the other county workers. Id.  The evidence 
revealed that the HCFD’s retaliatory actions after his testimony included giving him 
assignments unrelated to his position, such as clerical duties or “strenuous field work.” 
Id.  In addition, his supervisors had moved him around to several office environments 
that were “less desirable” than his regular office. Id.  One year, he was the only em­
ployee in the HCFD that did not get the raise of twelve percent. Id.  Finally, upon his 
refusal to accept a demotion, HCFD fired him. Id. at *2. 
113. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1568. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1577. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1578. 
118. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1289 (3d Cir. 1996). 
119. Id.  Would-be testimony referred to Pro’s testimony, which was scheduled to 
occur but did not take place. Id. 
120. Id. at 1291. 
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later, she was discharged from her post due to “an on-going depart­
ment reorganization.”124  Pro brought a section 1983 action125 
against Donatucci alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of her 
First Amendment rights.126 
The court posited “that the context of [courtroom testimony] 
raise[d] the speech to a level of public concern regardless of its con­
tent.”127  Its ruling relied on two important considerations: public 
employees’ interests in testifying truthfully and the judicial interest 
in having them testify without fearing retaliation.128  Reiterating 
that testimony deserves protection, despite the nature of the 
speech, the court reasoned that the crux of the matter boiled down 
to “control,” or lack thereof.129  A public employee may choose to 
comment or not on an issue that is likely to trigger retribution from 
his or her supervisor.130  But “[a] subpoenaed witness” is compelled 
to appear at trial, or, in the alternative, face contempt of court.131 
Thus, retaliating against employees for acts that they are legally ob­
ligated to fulfill is unjust.132  Furthermore, no distinction exists be­
tween retaliating against an employee who actually testifies at trial 
or one who appears in order to testify but does not.133  Lastly, the 
court concluded that this protection was not without exception, but 
subject to the Pickering balancing test, which weighs the interest of 
the employee in speaking on a matter of public concern against that 
of the employer in regulating the speech.134 
124. Id. 
125. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The 
statute states in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
Id. 
126. Pro, 81 F.3d at 1285. 
127. Id. at 1291 n.4. 
128. Id. at 1291. 




133. Id. at 1291. 
134. Id. at 1291 n.4. 
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B.	 Protecting Truthful Testimony Only When it Advances a 
Public Concern 
The Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City court refused to automati­
cally grant First Amendment protection to a policeman’s truthful 
testimony, relying on the rationale that testimony concerning pri­
vate issues did not deserve protection.135  Carl Kirby, a police of­
ficer, testified in front of the City Personnel Appeals Committee 
regarding a grievance that his co-worker had filed in response to 
the disciplinary actions taken against the co-worker for damaging a 
patrol car.136  In his testimony, Kirby discussed the maintenance 
history of the patrol car and his assessment of the officer’s habits in 
maintaining and driving the car.137 
Kirby’s testimony signaled the beginning of a slew of discipli­
nary actions against him.138  Shortly after testifying, he “received an 
oral reprimand for ‘[f]ailure to support the Department’s Adminis­
tration.’”139  He was eventually demoted to a lower position for 
“poor job performance” and failure to comply with proper policies 
and procedures.140  He asserted that this treatment was in retalia­
tion for his testimony before the committee.141  After filing a griev­
ance the Appeals Committee reinstated Kirby to his previous 
position.142  He maintained, however, that his supervisors contin­
ued to retaliate against him by giving him menial tasks.143  Kirby 
finally brought suit against his employer.144 
Focusing solely on the content of Kirby’s testimony, the court 
did not grant him First Amendment protection because his testi­
mony addressed a private matter.145 Kirby posited that issues such 
as the reliability of the car and his co-worker’s negligence in main­
taining the car’s transmission fluids involved private interests.146 
135. Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2004).  Courts 
have characterized truthful testimony related to private interests as speech aimed at 
simply furthering the plaintiff’s personal concerns, distinguishing it from speech ad­
dressing issues of public concern. Id.; see also Arvinger v. Mayor of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 
79 (4th Cir. 1988). 
136.	 Kirby, 388 F.3d at 443. 
137.	 Id. 




142.	 Id. at 445. 
143.	 Id. 
144.	 Id. 
145.	 Id. at 450. 
146.	 Id. at 447. 
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The court further explained that testimony given in a public hearing 
did not automatically become a matter of public concern.147  In­
stead, the key issue was whether the testimony served to further a 
public debate or merely advanced the private interests of the public 
employee in question.148  Although the safety standards of a police 
car were at stake, the court did not regard this issue as advancing a 
public debate.149  As such, it deemed the issue not a matter of pub­
lic concern.150 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT POST-GARCETTI 
A. Protecting Truthful Testimony as Citizen Speech 
The courts’ decisions post-Garcetti reflects two distinct inter­
pretations of the Supreme Court’s rulings.  Some courts hold that 
testimony given pursuant to a public employee’s official duties is 
speech that belongs to the government, thus it is not protected de­
spite its context.151  Others opine that testifying truthfully at a judi­
cial trial is every citizen’s obligation.152  Consequently, full 
protection is granted because “[w]hen a government employee tes­
tifies truthfully, [he] is not ‘simply performing his . . . job duties[;]’ 
rather, [he] is acting as a citizen and is bound by the dictates of the 
court . . . .”153 
Indeed, the Reilly v. City of Atlantic City Court adopted the 
latter rationale in reaching its decision.154  Robert Reilly worked 
for the Atlantic City Police Department for twenty-five years.155  In 
the course of his employment, he testified as a witness for the pros­
ecution in a trial concerning department corruption indirectly in­
volving his supervisor.156  Reilly had obtained information about 
the corruption while he worked as an investigator for the depart­
ment.157  He was later charged with several disciplinary violations, 
including making disparaging comments to a colleague.158  Upon 
147. Id. at 446. 
148. Id. at 447. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009). 
152. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008). 
153. Id. at 231 (citation omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 
(2006)). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 220. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 221. 
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reviewing the evidence, an independent hearing officer recom­
mended that Reilly be suspended for four days.159  But, his two su­
pervisors demoted him instead.160  Finally, Reilly resigned, and, 
subsequently, he filed a section 1983 lawsuit.161  Reilly asserted that 
his supervisors retaliated against him because of his previous testi­
mony in the police corruption case where one of them was in­
volved.162  His supervisors pleaded that they were entitled to 
qualified immunity because, consistent with Garcetti, Reilly’s trial 
testimony was not protected speech because it stemmed from his 
official job duties.163 
The court disagreed and stated that the Supreme Court’s pre­
cedent “settled principles” of our jurisprudence, and that the 
Court’s judgment supported the conclusion that Reilly’s testimony 
was citizen speech deserving full protection.164  The court posited 
that this conclusion was rooted in the axiom “that ‘[e]very citizen 
. . . owes to his society the duty of giving testimony to aid in the 
enforcement of the law.’”165  Since the substance of Reilly’s testi­
mony had been obtained on the job, the question before the court 
was whether a public employee’s testimonial speech stemming from 
his job duties deserved constitutional protection.166  The Third Cir­
cuit stated that, when a public employee testifies “[he] is not ‘simply 
performing his . . . job duties[;]’ rather, [he] is acting as a citizen 
. . . .”167  Thus, per Reilly, a public employee’s testimony is consid­
ered citizen speech because when a public employee testifies, his 
citizen duty prevails over his employee duty.168 
In a similar vein, the court limited Garcetti’s reach “to the 
question whether Reilly spoke as a citizen when he testified . . . .”169 
The court also pointed out that the Garcetti ruling only applied to 
the speech embodied in plaintiff Ceballos’s internal memorandum 
and not to the issue of truthful testimony.170  Identifying as the dis­
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 222. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 224. 
163. Id. at 226-27. 
164. Id. at 231. 
165. Id. at 228 (quoting Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961)). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 231 (citation omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 
(2006)). 
168. Id. at 228. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 231. 
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positive factor the fact that Reilly testified at trial in his capacity as 
a citizen, the court concluded that his testimony was protected.171 
B.	 No Immunity if Truthful Testimony is Made Pursuant to 
Official Duties 
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg agreed with Garcetti’s “official du­
ties” rationale, by holding that the truthful testimony of a public 
employee is not protected when given as an extension of his official 
duties.172  In 1991, Ron Huppert started working as a patrol officer 
and an inspector for the Pittsburg Police Department (PPD).173 
While working as a police officer, he was called to assist in investi­
gating corruption at the Pittsburg Public Works Yard.174  Huppert 
maintained “that [f]rom that time on, my superiors [at the PPD] 
treated me with scorn and as an outcast.”175  A year later, Huppert 
took the sergeant’s exam, but he did not get promoted even though 
he scored high on the test.176  His supervisor told him that he did 
not become a sergeant because he had a goatee.177 
In the following years while still working for the PPD, Huppert 
was engaged in an FBI investigation about alleged corruption 
within the department.178  He asserted that his work for the FBI 
was unrelated to his PPD position.179  Subsequently, he was trans­
ferred “to a building known within the PPD as the Penal Colony, 
because disaffected and/or disfavored officers were assigned 
there.”180  Huppert’s new supervisor told him that he had been sent 
there because Huppert’s former supervisor wanted to fire 
Huppert.181 
In 2004, Huppert was subpoenaed to testify before a civil grand 
jury in charge of investigating corruption in the PPD.182  Shortly 
thereafter, he was transferred from his position as a gang investiga­
tor to a fraud and forgeries investigator, with an increased wor­
171. Id. at 227-28.  Also, the court did not address whether Reilly’s testimony 
constituted a matter of public concern because it upheld the district court’s affirmative 
ruling on the matter. Id. at 228. 
172.	 Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009). 
173.	 Id. at 698. 
174.	 Id. at 698-99. 





180.	 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
181.	 Id. 
182.	 Id. at 700. 
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kload.183  He claimed that his transfer “was initiated simply as a 
method of harassment.”184  Huppert and the Patrol Officers Associ­
ation were finally forced to file a grievance against the PPD after 
Huppert’s superior “attempted to replace Huppert’s superlative 
yearly evaluation,” conducted by another sergeant, with an evalua­
tion Huppert’s superior had prepared.185  Huppert eventually re­
tired on disability.186 
With regard to Huppert’s testimony before the grand jury, the 
court determined that his testimony was not protected because it 
flowed from his official duties.187  The court further explained that 
speech pursuant to one’s official duties is distinguished from speech 
as a private citizen because it “does not infringe any liberties the 
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”188  The court 
disagreed with the Reilly rationale and refused to follow its ruling, 
claiming that it unjustifiably chipped away at the Garcetti 
holding.189 
Furthermore, the court asserted that, in California, police of­
ficers have an official duty to testify.190  The court relied on Christal 
v. Police Commission of San Francisco, which predated Garcetti, 
stating that, in accordance with California law, police officers must 
testify freely in front of a grand jury.191  The Huppert court stated, 
however, that its holding did not categorically foreclose the possi­
bility of protecting a police officer’s speech.192  An exception might 
be made, if, for example, speech revealed corruption of which expo­
sure was paramount in the proper functioning of the government’s 
duties.193  Finally, the court stated that other avenues, like “whistle­
blower” statutes, existed to remedy reprisal that resulted from re­
porting government corruption.194 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 700-01. 
186. Id. at 701. 
187. Id. at 708. 
188. Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006)). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 709. 
191. Id. at 720; Christal v. Police Comm’n of S.F., 92 P.2d 416, 418-19 (1939). 
192. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 709. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 710. 
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V. SAFEGUARDING TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY 
A.	 Protecting Public Employees and the Integrity of Our Justice 
System: The Need for Constitutional Protection 
In the current Garcetti-free speech climate, where the govern­
ment is unrestrained to retaliate against public employees for testi­
fying truthfully, unfettered First Amendment protection is 
necessary.  Presently, public employees face a triple dilemma195: 
testifying truthfully and losing their jobs; lying under oath and com­
mitting perjury; or refusing to testify and thus facing contempt. 
Testifying is a civic duty, autonomous of a public employee’s job 
obligations.196  As Judge Fletcher stated in his Huppert dissenting 
opinion, “[t]he fact that the employer may require its employees to 
obey a law that exists independent of the employment relationship 
does not allow the employer to retaliate against an employee for 
obeying that law.”197  Arriving at the truth requires some guaran­
tees that the one who testifies will not be penalized.198  Punishing 
employees for speaking truthfully while complying with an obliga­
tory civic duty goes against the grain of fairness and decreases the 
efficiency of our judicial system.199 
The Supreme Court has not specifically deliberated on the is­
sue of truthful testimony but has intimated that it regards a public 
employee’s truthful testimony as a unique type of speech distinct 
from the others.200  Indeed, the Court has recognized that a public 
employee’s testimony regarding government policies falls within 
the realm of protected speech.201  In Perry v. Sindermann, the 
plaintiff, a professor in the Texas state college system, who also 
served as the president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Asso­
ciation for a short time, had testified on several occasions before 
committees of the Texas Legislature against his college’s policies.202 
When his annual employment contract was not renewed, the plain­
tiff alleged retaliation for his critical testimonies.203  The Court ob­
served that the plaintiff’s “allegations present[ed] a bona fide 
constitutional claim.  For this Court has held that a teacher’s public 
195. See id. at 709; Reilly v. Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). 
196. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 709-10. 
197. Id. at 722 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
198. See Wells, supra note 2, at 960. R 
199. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 722 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
200. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444 (2006). 
201. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972). 
202. Id. at 594-95. 
203. Id. 
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criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be con­
stitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible ba­
sis for termination of his employment.”204 
In the same vein, the lower courts that have adopted this ratio­
nale have reasoned that truthful testimony, which is often compul­
sory, differs from other forms of speech.205  As the Third Circuit 
pointed out, the crux of the issue is control.206  Because a public 
employee cannot choose to avoid testifying without facing conse­
quences, retaliation in this context would be unjust.207  It is there­
fore imperative that truthful testimony receive First Amendment 
protection.208  This protection would also align with the doctrine of 
the separation of powers and help support the judicial system’s mis­
sion of discovering the truth by disallowing government intrusion in 
the affairs of the judiciary.209 
Moreover, affording constitutional protection to truthful testi­
mony is compelling seeing that whistleblower statutes, albeit well­
intentioned, are ineffective.  But, some courts dismissing violation 
of freedom of speech claims do not hesitate to use the existence of 
whistleblower statutes as a pretext for denying protection.210  In­
deed, there are about forty whistleblower protection statutes, but, 
despite this impressive number, more has proven less for federal 
whistleblowers.211  The Government Accountability Office has re­
ported that the whistleblower redress system is “adversarial, ineffi­
cient, time-consuming, and costly.”212  As a matter of fact, 
whistleblowers lose their cases so often that some advocates advise 
204. Id. at 598 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
205. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1996). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id.  This should include truthful testimony in the context of administrative, 
civil, or criminal trial. Id. 
209. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006). This represents the other side 
of the coin of the concern the Court observed regarding principles of federalism and 
separation of powers.  In Garcetti, the concern was that to hold the government respon­
sible for regulating speech stemming out of an employee’s official duties would create 
“permanent judicial intervention” into the government’s activity. Id.  However, to al­
low the government to constantly interfere into the judiciary’s operation by retaliating 
against employees’ truthful testimonies involves the same violation of the separation of 
powers’ principle. See id. 
210. Id. at 425; Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 710 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Garcia, supra note 21, at 22-23. R 
211. Katel, supra note 80, at 269-71. R 
212. A System in Need of Reform,, supra note 80, at 3; An Opportunity for Re- R 
form, supra note 80, at 3. R 
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whistleblowers to report anonymously to the press instead of fol­
lowing the regular redress protocol.213 
Analogously, in his Garcetti dissenting opinion, Justice Souter 
noted that common law and statutory protections available to pub­
lic employees are “patchwork” and of little value.214  Indeed, in 
many cases involving on-duty speech that have resulted in the gov­
ernment’s victory, no other remedies have been available to public 
employees.215  Therefore, in the interest of disallowing government 
intrusion into the judiciary process, and since the current statutory 
framework has failed to guard public employees against reprisal, 
the constitutional protection of truthful testimony should become a 
priority. 
The common law approach of witnesses’ immunization, aiming 
at preserving the integrity of the judicial system, should apply to 
truthful testimony.216  The roots of this tradition are “well grounded 
in history and reason.”217  Recognizing the paramount importance 
of testimonial speech, Congress codified the common law by mak­
ing false testimony given under oath a crime.218  The Supreme 
Court has resolved to protect testimonial speech outside the First 
213. Katel, supra note 80, at 265.  In 2006, Thomas Devine, legal director of the R 
Governmental Accountability Project, told the CQ Researcher that from 1994 to 2005, 
only one out of 120 Federal Circuit decisions that whistleblowers filed favored the pub­
lic employee. Id. at 270.  A Federal Circuit landmark case, Lachance v. White, set the 
tone for this unsuccessful rate when it ruled that a whistleblower can have a reasonable 
claim only if “a disinterested observer” attests to the government’s gross mismanage­
ment.  Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Ever since, any witness 
testifying for the government has resulted in the plaintiff’s defeat.  Katel, supra note 80, R 
at 270.  Furthermore, from 1999 to 2006, employees won only two out of fifty-two 
MSPB cases. Id. 
214. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Garcia, supra note 21, at R 
25 (“[S]tatutory protection for whistleblowers can be ineffective and sometimes 
counterproductive for public employees.”); see also A System in Need of Reform, supra 
note 80, at 3; An Opportunity for Reform, supra note 80, at 3 (evidencing the ineffi- R 
ciency of the whistleblower redress system). 
215. Garcia, supra note 21, at 25-26. R 
216. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332-34 (1983). 
217. Id. at 334 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)). 




(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
 
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
 
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testi­
mony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, will­
fully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which
 
he does not believe to be true; or
 
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of
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Amendment context.219  The cases that grant trial witnesses full im­
munity from civil damage claims illustrates the Court’s favorable 
position on testimony.220  The rationale for this protection hinged 
on the likelihood that a witness’s fear of damages liability may lead 
to self-censorship which, in turn, would jeopardize the justice sys­
tem’s mission of discovering the truth.221 
In the interest of the truth-finding process, a parallel approach 
should apply to safeguarding a government worker’s truthful testi­
mony.  Public employees are vulnerable to job retaliation as a result 
of testimony their employers may regard as unfavorable.222  Fearing 
their jobs are in jeopardy, or worse, the loss of their livelihoods, 
they may be inclined to adjust their testimonies to be more palat­
able to their employers.223  The fear of retaliation and employer-
induced witness intimidation against employees is real.224  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court characterized “[t]he danger of witness intimida­
tion” of an employer over its employee as “acute.”225  The Court 
noted that “[n]ot only can the employer fire the employee, but job 
fully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be 
true; 
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This 
section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or 
without the United States. 
Id. 
219. Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1998) (stating that an at-will em­
ployee who suffered retaliation for obeying a federal grand-jury subpoena was entitled 
to damage claims); Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330-31. 
220. See supra note 219. R 
221. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333 (“A witness’ apprehension of subsequent damages 
liability might induce two forms of self-censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant 
to come forward to testify.  And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be 
distorted by the fear of subsequent liability.” (citation omitted)). 
222. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th 
Cir.1989). 
223. Id. 
224. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 240 (1978); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-70, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: VA DID 
LITTLE  UNTIL  RECENTLY TO  INFORM  EMPLOYEES  ABOUT  THEIR  RIGHTS 3 (2000), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00070.pdf (stating that fear of retaliation 
could deter Veteran Affairs employees from coming forth with claims of misconduct). 
Only twenty-one percent of Veteran Affairs employees reported that protection against 
retaliation was reasonably sufficient. Survey of Federal Employees on Civil Service, 
supra note 80, at 3 (stating that fear of retaliation “for reporting misconduct continues R 
to be a concern for many federal employees”). Thirty-six percent reported that protec­
tion against retaliation was inadequate and thirteen percent believed it was sufficient. 
Id. at 4.  Twenty-five percent thought that they would be retaliated against for reporting 
misconduct. Id. 
225. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 240. 
649 
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assignments can be switched, hours can be adjusted, wage and sal­
ary increases held up, and other more subtle forms of influence ex­
erted.”226  Out of the fear of retribution, public employees may 
“magnify uncertainties, and thus . . . deprive the finder of fact of 
candid, objective, and undistorted evidence,”227 which would have 
undesirable consequences for the integrity of our justice system.228 
B. Truthful Testimony is Inherently a Matter of Public Concern 
The Supreme Court, in Connick and Rankin, deemed that the 
context alone may elevate speech to a matter of public concern.229 
The context of a statement is one of three elements courts take into 
account to determine whether a public employee’s speech involves 
a matter of public concern.230  In Connick, the Court stated that 
context, which is determined by the time, place, and manner of 
speech, is one factor that may determine whether speech is a matter 
of public concern.231  However, the Court held that context did not 
elevate the plaintiff’s questionnaire to the level of public con­
cern.232  This was because the plaintiff prepared the questionnaire 
while in her office, on the government’s time, engaging other co­
workers to complete the questionnaire during their working 
hours—thus increasing the chances of office disruption.233 
Similarly, the Rankin Court analyzed the context of plaintiff’s 
speech, but in contrast with Connick, it found that the context in 
which she uttered her remark was the sole factor for classifying her 
statement a matter of public concern.234  Rankin’s remark about the 
United States President “[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get 
him,” received protection because she said it while discussing the 
President’s welfare policies.235 
226. Id. 
227. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1983). 
228. Id. 
229. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 147-48 (1983). 
230. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (holding that a matter of public concern is mea­
sured by “content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole 
record”). 
231. Id. at 153 (“[T]he context in which the dispute arose is also significant.”). 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381-386. 
235. Id. at 387.  The Court also considered the plaintiff’s rank in the constable’s 
office. Id. at 390-91.  Determining that Rankin held a low-level position, the Court 
observed that her statement could not cause office disruption. Id. 
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Analogously, compelled testimonial speech is contextually a 
per se matter of public concern.236  That is because testimony given 
before a judicial body pursuant to a civic duty, during the time set 
by the court, and in accordance with the rules of evidence, is inher­
ently important to the public.  The Fifth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion when it decided that the context of the plaintiff’s testi­
mony guaranteed its protection.237  The court noted that “[u]nder 
certain circumstances . . . the context in which the employee speaks 
may be sufficient to elevate the speech to the level of public 
concern.”238 
In addition, even when a public employee testified on a merely 
private matter, such as her supervisor’s extramarital affair, the testi­
mony was protected.239  Because the duty to testify is often not only 
compulsory but also has significant civic importance,240 context 
alone should be the determining factor, because it is context which 
elevates testimony to a matter of public concern.241  Adopting a 
bright-line rule would avoid confusion and unpredictable results, 
thereby benefiting public employees, the government, and our jus­
tice system. 
The “inherent matter of public concern” rule should apply to 
truthful testimony, but it should not include a public employee’s 
testimony about his own grievances as these cases deal with private 
employment disputes.242  Naturally, a per se matter of public con­
236. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th 
Cir.1989); Michael, supra note 5, at 442. R 
237. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578 (“When an employee testifies before an official 
government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is inherently 
of public concern.”). 
238. Id. at 1577. 
239. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir.1996). 
240. The notion that testifying in court is a civic duty is grounded in Supreme 
Court precedent.  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-09 (1974).  In United States 
v. Nixon the Court, asserting that “presumptive privilege for Presidential communica­
tions” is not absolute because every citizen is obligated to obey the rule of law, 
observed: 
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both funda­
mental and comprehensive. . . . The very integrity of the judicial system and
 
public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
 
within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it
 
is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for
 





241. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1577. 
242. Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that 
“employment grievances in which the employee is complaining about her own job treat­
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cern should be subject to the Pickering test, which balances a public 
employee’s right to speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern 
with the government’s interest in effectively performing its du­
ties.243  But a public employee’s involuntary, truthful testimony 
should be given compelling weight, and the government’s interest 
should prevail only in cases of extreme importance.244 
C.	 Truthful Testimony Pursuant to a Public Employee’s Job 
Duties Should be Protected 
This part of the Note argues that the Garcetti decision that 
speech pursuant to one’s official duties enjoys no protection does 
not pertain to truthful testimony. Garcetti placed an additional ob­
stacle in the way of a public employee’s First Amendment claim.245 
Indeed, this decision has added another layer of jurisprudential 
murkiness to the already muddled waters of public employees’ 
speech.246  The “official duties” test has created confusion on the 
ment” are not safeguarded because they fall under the category of private employment 
disputes). 
243.	 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
244. Tedder v. Norman, 167 F.3d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir. 1999). A public employee 
testimony is involuntary or compelled when his official duty compels him to testify. 
Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1997).  The Eighth Circuit con­
cluded that the Law Enforcement Training Academy’s interest outweighed the deputy 
director’s free speech interest because the voluntary deposition testimony disrupted the 
relationship equilibrium in the academy. Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1215.  In the same vein, 
the Third Circuit distinguished between voluntary and involuntary testimony by attach­
ing less weight to a police officer’s First Amendment interest because he had testified 
voluntary. Green, 105 F.3d at 888.  The court argued that his voluntary testimony had 
created tension and mistrust among his colleagues, thereby undermining the efficient 
operation of the police department. Id. 
245. Hudson, supra note 32, at 16 (asserting that Garcetti has undermined a pub- R 
lic employee’s ability to vindicate against retaliation against speech on a matter of pub­
lic concern); see also Chemerinksy, supra note 68, at 539. R 
246. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 426-31 (2006) (Souter, J., dissent­
ing).  The majority in Garcetti did not regard it useful to define a public employee’s job 
duties, observing that “job descriptions” rarely resemble an employee’s day-to-day job 
duties. Id. at 424-25 (majority opinion).  Consequently, the Court opted to adopt a 
case-by-case approach which, albeit plausible in theory, leads to ad-hoc results in prac­
tice.  And the dissent’s prediction that failure to define job duties would result in more 
litigation has proven true. See Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding that truthful testimony even when related to a matter of public concern 
is not protected so long as it is made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties); 
Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that speech not pro­
tected because it flowed out of plaintiff’s duty to cooperate with the investigation); 
Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that chief jailer’s testi­
mony was not protected because it stemmed from his duties); Deprado v. City of 
Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1346-47 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that police officer’s 
subpoenaed grand jury testimony was not protected speech); see also Garcia, supra 
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issue of protection of truthful testimony and has further eroded 
public employees’ constitutional protection.247  After Garcetti, the 
lower courts have been pondering the question of what constitutes 
speech in the course of one’s employment.248  The answer fairly 
often has resulted in the overzealous application of Garcetti and 
courts’ willingness to categorize any speech in the workplace as on-
duty speech.249  This decision has of course had a chilling effect on 
truthful testimony.250 
However, Garcetti did not address the issue of truthful testi­
mony and as such the courts should construe it narrowly and in 
particular, they should not apply Garcetti to truthful testimony. 
Garcetti’s focus of speech was the memorandum that the plaintiff, a 
deputy district attorney, wrote.251  In it, he recommended the dis­
missal of a case because in his assessment, the affidavit used to ob­
tain the search warrant contained serious misrepresentations.252 
Compiling the memorandum was clearly the plaintiff’s professional 
duty, not his civic obligation; thus his speech belonged to the gov­
ernment.  Conversely, testimony before a fact-finding body, 
prompted by a worker’s job obligation is inseparable from his testi­
fying duty as a citizen and is governed by the rules of the court 
note 21, at 22. But cf. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2008) R 
(ruling that a public employee’s truthful testimony is automatically protected because 
every citizen has a duty to testify); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Being deposed in a civil suit pursuant to a subpoena was unquestionably not one of 
Morales’ job duties. . . .”). 
247. Hudson, supra note 32, at 16; Garcia, supra note 21, at 22. R 
248. Dale, supra note 68, at 196-200.  The author, who pointed out that courts R 
have taken a formalist approach to Garcetti, stated: 
As lower courts struggle to implement the decision, they approach Garcetti in 
several ways: Some decisions emphasize process, assuming that Garcetti al­
tered plaintiff’s burdens of pleading or proof.  Others turn on substance, focus­
ing on the employee’s position, the content of the employee’s speech, or the 
audience for the employee’s statement . . . . Some ground their decision on the 
employee’s status; others emphasize the content of the speech; and still others 
focus on the audience at which the remarks were directed. 
Id. 
249. Id. at 196-97; Garcia, supra note 21, at 23-24; see also Chemerinksy, supra R 
note 68, at 539 (“[Garcetti] is not only a loss of free speech rights for millions of govern- R 
ment employees, but it is really a loss for the general public, who are much less likely to 
learn of government misconduct.”). 
250. See Huppert, 574 F.3d at 708; Bradley, 479 F.3d at 538; Green, 226 F. App’x 
at 886; Deprado, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1344; Hudson, supra note 32, at 16 (citing an attor- R 
ney, representing public employees in First Amendment litigation, saying that 
“[Garcetti] has resulted in a lower level of constitutional protection for many public 
employees”). 
251. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415. 
252. Id. at 421. 
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system.  Indeed, three out of four dissenting justices—namely, Jus­
tices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg—poignantly noted that not all 
speech derives from one’s job duty and “the claim relating to truth­
ful testimony in court must surely be analyzed independently to 
protect the integrity of the judicial process.”253 
Moreover, applying Garcetti to truthful testimony would not 
only undermine the judiciary’s truth-seeking mission, but it may 
also prove detrimental to the government’s efficient operation and 
to the function of democracy.  A further examination of Garcetti 
reveals that the impetus for the Court’s decision was to quash the 
possibility that every work-related dispute would turn into a consti­
tutional claim.254  The purpose was to allow the government a 
greater degree of influence over speech that damages its proper 
functioning and causes disharmonious work environments.255  The 
Court’s deferential treatment of the government is sensible given 
that the government has an obligation to perform its duties.256  In a 
democracy, the government must carry out the will of the people.257 
Therefore, the government needs to manage its employees, deter­
mine job expectations, and assess their performances without the 
looming fear of litigation.258  The government achieves its function 
through the operation of its agencies.259  In turn, public workers 
whom these agencies employ implement their duties, and in ex­
change for their work, receive a salary.260 
To a certain extent, this contractual relationship justifies the 
government’s dominion over its employees’ speech.  Indeed, al­
lowing every work-related gripe to turn into a constitutional issue 
would paralyze the government’s activity and render its existence 
useless.261  Considered on a larger scale, the very existence of de­
mocracy depends on the government’s ability to perform efficiently, 
hold its employees accountable and have a degree of control over 
their speech.  After all, the government cannot run like a public 
square when acting in the role of employer.262 
253. Id. at 444 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
254. Id. at 412 (majority opinion). 
255. Id. 





261. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). 
262. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). 
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On the other hand, democracy cannot exist without public 
workers’ freedom of speech and governmental accountability.263 
Moreover, there is no justification for government control of a pub­
lic employee’s truthful testimony.  Testimony, such as that before a 
criminal, civil, or administrative fact-finding body is not speech that 
belongs to the government.  Allowing a public employer to retaliate 
against truthful testimony would sanction intrusion into the judicial 
system as well as its truth-seeking mission.264  The fact that a public 
employee’s official duty compels him to testify is unrelated to his 
obligation as a citizen to truthful testimony. This should also apply 
to those employees, such as law enforcement officers, whose duty to 
testify, is part of their job descriptions because in a democratic soci­
ety citizen testimony takes priority.265 
Furthermore, government accountability without its employ­
ees’ ability to testify freely would be an illusion.  Indeed, testimo­
nial censorship has undesirable consequences for the interest of the 
public employee; for the integrity of our justice system; for the pub­
lic’s interest in holding the government accountable for its actions; 
and, certainly, for the government itself.266  The public employer 
should know that, if its workers fear to testifying truthfully, the gov­
ernment also pays the price in the resulting costs and inefficiencies 
from not addressing misconduct and office corruption.267 
In addition, Garcetti observed that public employees are not 
entirely deprived of First Amendment protection for speech uttered 
at work, but they have to show they spoke as citizens and not 
merely within the scope of their duties.268  For example, if they take 
their concerns to a public forum such as the press,269 provided that 
the Pickering test is satisfied, their claims may survive.270  Conse­
263. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968). 
264. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 444 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he claim relating to 
truthful testimony in court must surely be analyzed independently to protect the integ­
rity of the judicial process.”). 
265. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
266. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Still, the First Amendment 
safeguard rests on something more, being the value to the public of receiving the opin­
ions and information that a public employee may disclose.”). 
267. Id. at 425 (majority opinion) (“Exposing governmental inefficiency and mis­
conduct is a matter of considerable significance.”). 
268. Id. at 419. 
269. Hudson, supra note 32, at 17 (noting that even this is not a safe and one R 
hundred percent guarantee). 
270. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent, however, criti­
cized this rationale stating that despite the audience, no considerable difference should 
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quently, because testimony is conducted in a public forum, com­
pelled by every citizen’s duty to testify, the “official duties” test 
does not apply.  Finally, a public employee does not relinquish all 
his First Amendment liberties in exchange for a paycheck.271 
“[T]he Court has recognized that a citizen who works for the gov­
ernment is nonetheless a citizen.  The First Amendment limits . . . a 
public employer . . . [from] incidentally or intentionally [restricting] 
the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citi­
zens.”272  Allowing the government to punish its workers for fulfil­
ling their obligation as citizens to testify, under the pretext of 
official speech, not only robs them of constitutionally protected 
rights, but also, in effect, places them in a category of second-class 
citizenry. 
CONCLUSION 
Not all speech is created equal. In the public employee’s First 
Amendment arsenal, testimonial speech is unique because it is 
made in a public forum pursuant to a civic obligation.273  Testimo­
nial speech is inherently a matter of public concern and indepen­
dent of a public employee’s official duties, even if his job provides 
the impetus to testify.  For these reasons, compelled truthful testi­
mony should receive unfettered First Amendment protection. 
First and foremost, at stake is the integrity of our justice sys­
tem.  Fear of reprisal from a vengeful boss may dissuade a witness 
from testifying truthfully.274  This in turn would threaten the proper 
functioning of our judicial process and lead to unjust results be-
though delving further into this argument would be outside the scope of this Note it is 
worthwhile to briefly mention the ramification of the majority’s rationale. First, the 
public employee would essentially be addressing the same issue and the court analysis 
would be identical, whether he raised it within his work’s chain of command or took it 
to the press.  Second, going public rather than addressing issues within the governmen­
tal agency would not serve the government’s goal of operating efficiently.  By contrast, 
this practice could result in distraction, prove disruptive for the government’s proper 
functioning, and cause unnecessary embarrassment, the very ailments that the Court 
sought to avoid.  Finally, in Justice Stevens’s words “it [is] perverse to fashion a new 
rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before 
talking frankly to their superiors,” and “it is senseless to let constitutional protection for 
exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.” Id. 
271. Id. at 428. 
272. Id. at 419 (majority opinion) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 
(1972)). 
273. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). 
274. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 
1989). 
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cause this process depends largely on ascertaining the truth.275 
Granting constitutional protection to a government worker’s testi­
monial speech is even more compelling given the current inade­
quate statutory remedy through whistleblower laws.  As such, the 
courts should apply the common law rationale of protection of a 
witness’s testimony from damage claims to truthful testimony to a 
government worker’s compelled truthful testimony.276 
In addition, a law that does not protect the testimony of a pub­
lic employee is not only damaging for our justice system but also for 
our public employees, government, and taxpayers.  In a time of re­
cord governmental spending, we especially need its workers to re­
port fraud, abuse, or waste.  We need them to tell the truth without 
fear of losing their livelihood. In the words of the late Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, “vigilance is necessary to ensure that public 
employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, 
not because it hampers public functions but simply because superi­
ors disagree with the content of employees’ speech.”277  Protecting 
truthful testimony is one step toward maintaining a vibrant dia­




276. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 325 (1983). 
277. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). 
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